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Abstract 
Non-reductive physicalists have long held that the special sciences offer explanations of some 
phenomena that are objectively superior to physical explanations.  This explanatory “autonomy” has 
largely been based on the multiple realizability argument.  Recently, in the face of the local reduction 
and disjunctive property responses to multiple realizability, some defenders of non-reductive 
physicalism have suggested that autonomy can be grounded merely in human cognitive limitations.  
In this paper, I argue that this is mistaken.  By distinguishing between two kinds of abstraction I 
show that the greater explanatory relevance of some special science predicates (to certain 
explananda) is both non-anthropocentric and not solely based on considerations of multiple 
realizability. This shows that the explanatory autonomy of the special sciences is safe from the local 
reduction and disjunctive property strategies, even if they are successful responses to the multiple 
realizability argument. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
For roughly forty years, non-reductive physicalism (NRP) has been the dominant view in 
philosophy of mind, and multiple realizability has been the dominant argument for it. Of course, 
there have long been prominent dissenters from this consensus who instead defend a version of 
reductive physicalism (RP), often by either (i) appealing to disjunctive properties or (ii) invoking the 
“local reduction” strategy, each of which I discuss below.  I take the following three claims to be 
endorsed by a strong version of RP: 
(R1) Biological, psychological or other special science properties are type-identical to 
physical properties.1 
 
(R2) These property identities, together with the generalizations of physical theory, can offer 
explanations of why the generalizations of the special sciences are true. 
 
(R3) Explanations that use special science predicates can be replaced by explanations that use 
only physical predicates without any loss of explanatory power. 
 
I take it that the claim that the special sciences are “autonomous” is largely captured by the denial of 
(R2) and (R3).  Strong NRP denies each of (R1)-(R3).  However, in the last decade, a weaker version 
                                                 
1 In this paper, I use the term ‘physical’ in a restricted sense to refer to low-level or microphysical 
properties and predicates which exclude mental, social, and some biological properties and predicates 
but include some neurochemical ones. 
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of (what is claimed to be) NRP has been suggested—call it “weak NRP”—which accepts (R1) (or at 
least does not argue against it) but denies (R2) and (R3) (at least on one reading of these claims) (see, 
e.g., Antony 1999, 18; Clapp 2001). Weak NRP construes reducibility as entirely, or primarily, an 
epistemic-cum-semantic issue. 
In this paper, I will largely set aside questions about property reduction.  That is, I will grant 
that the multiple realizability argument does not show that (R1) is false—that it does not establish 
strong NRP.  Instead I will focus on the nature and status of weak NRP.  If (R2) and (R3) are false, is 
this merely because of our cognitive limitations? Or are there non-anthropocentric reasons why the 
special sciences exist?  After discussing how the local reduction and disjunctive strategies attempt to 
defend (R1) against the multiple realizability argument (Section 2), I argue that weak NRP is distinct 
from RP only if (R2) and (R3) are false for non-anthropocentric reasons (Section 3).  I then identify 
such a reason—the greater explanatory relevance of special science predicates to some explananda. 
In Sections 4 and 5, I argue that distinguishing between two kinds of abstraction shows that this 
explanatory virtue is both non-anthropocentric and independent of considerations of multiple 
realizability, which blocks the local reduction and disjunctive strategies. 
As is standard in debates about reductionism and mental causation, I assume a “sparse” 
conception of properties according to which differences in properties must reflect differences in 
causal powers (cf., e.g., Kim 1998, 105-6).  Properties are individuated more coarsely on sparse 
views than on an extreme “abundant” conception according to which only synonymous or logically 
equivalent predicates express the same property.  Because of this, a single sparse property may be 
multiply expressible: it may be expressed by several non-synonymous predicates.  A certain kind of 
multiple expressibility will be important in Section 5. 
2. The Multiple Realizability Argument and Two Responses 
 
 Here is one formulation of the multiple realizability argument against (R1), as applied to 
mental properties: 
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(1) If mental property M is reducible, then there is some natural, physical property P such 
that necessarily, for all x, Mx iff Px.  (“General” or “uniform” property reduction is a 
necessary condition for reducibility.) 
 
(2) For any natural, physical property P that realizes M, it is possible for some individual 
to lack P but have M, since some other natural, physical property, Q, could realize 
M.2 (M is multiply realizable.) 
 
(3) The disjunctive property, P∨Q, is not a natural physical property. 
 
(4) So, there is no natural physical property P such that necessarily, Mx iff Px. 
 
(5) So, M is irreducible. 
 
Many philosophers have claimed that this argument for property irreducibility fails.  The 
most influential of these challenges—the local reduction strategy and the disjunctive strategy—deny 
premises (1) and (3), respectively.3 
2.1. The Local Reduction Strategy 
Put in schematic form, the local reduction strategy claims that reduction does not require that 
necessarily, for all x, Mx iff Px; rather, all it requires is that, given existing species or structure-types 
S1, S2, ... necessarily, for all x that are S1, Mx iff P1x, and necessarily, for all x that are S2, Mx iff P2x, 
etc. 
The most influential version of this strategy, what I call the eliminative version, concedes that 
general mental properties (that could be said to apply to many different species of organism) may be 
multiply realizable and hence irreducible.  However, such a general, uniform reduction is not needed, 
according to this strategy, because these general mental properties are not natural.  Rather, being in 
pain is merely a property in the “abundant sense”—is merely a concept or property designator—and 
is not projectible or causally efficacious.  Further, the local reductionist argues that, perhaps due to 
                                                 
2 Note that we are interested in total realizers since they are the only plausible candidates for the 
reduction of special science properties. 
3 Premise (2) has also been denied, by what I call the “direct argument” against the (substantive) 
multiple realizability of special science properties (cf. Shapiro 2004). I believe that what I say in §§4 
and 5 could also be used to reply to this strategy.  
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evolutionary processes, the predicate ‘is in pain’ likely expresses a unique physical realizer in all 
normal members of a given species.  Thus, the allegedly unnatural property being in pain is 
“partitioned” into natural properties that are unique to particular species or structural types: pain-in-
S1, pain-in-S2, etc.  Then, each of these species-specific high-level properties can be reduced to the 
(allegedly) unique physical property, P1, P2, ... that realizes it in the respective species.  This version 
captures the local reduction strategy as it is most often presented by David Lewis (e.g. 1994, 304-
308) and Jaegwon Kim (e.g., 1998, 109-111).4 
2.2. The Disjunctive Strategy 
The disjunctive strategy challenges premise (3) in the multiple realizability argument.  In 
effect, it claims that proponents of the multiple realizability argument have simply focused on the 
wrong physical properties.  According to the disjunctive strategy, there is a physical property that 
realizes M (namely, the disjunction of all of the possible non-disjunctive total realizers of M, which I 
denote by ‘∨Pi’) for which it holds that necessarily, for all x, Mx iff ∨Pix.  With the threat of multiple 
realizability neutralized, the idea is that this lawlike correlation can be easily “enhanced” into a 
property identity (see Kim 1998, 97).5 
3. Problems with an Anthropocentric Defense of Weak NRP 
 For years, many defenders of NRP followed Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor in thinking that 
the disjunctive strategy could be dismissed as a non-starter since all merely disjunctive properties 
(like being a raven or a writing desk) were supposedly “wildly heterogeneous,” non-natural and 
(hence) unprojectible.  However, as Kim (1998, 1999) has argued, this claim poses a problem for 
                                                 
4 An alternative, conservative version of the local reduction strategy takes it to be part of a package 
with the disjunctive strategy.  Each of the species-specific high-level properties is still identified with 
the corresponding physical realizer, but species-independent high-level properties are identified with 
disjunctive physical properties.   
5 See also Sober (1999).  Although the disjunctive strategy is sometimes attributed to Kim (e.g. 
Antony 1999, 3-4), it is not clear that he ever fully endorsed it as a response to the multiple 
realizability argument.  He seems to be ambivalent about the existence of disjunctive properties, and 
his position has changed over time. 
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NRP.  Given that any multiply realizable property is necessarily co-extensive with the disjunction of 
its possible realizers, if the disjunctive property is unnatural and unprojectible, then so is the multiply 
realizable property (cf. Antony 1999, 13). 
In response to this problem, there is a growing trend (even among defenders of NRP) of 
admitting that some disjunctive properties are natural (see Clapp 2001, Shoemaker 2007).  If one 
takes this line, what is the upshot for NRP?  In order to maintain the autonomy of psychology it 
appeared that we needed to show that mental properties were distinct from any physical properties 
that realize them.  Now, in accepting the cogency of the disjunctive strategy, we have admitted that 
multiple realizable properties can be identified with the disjunction of their possible realizers (i.e. 
accepted (R1)).  Does this mean that psychology is no longer an autonomous science—that we 
should also accept (R2) and (R3)? 
Lenny Clapp has in effect suggested that this depends on how we interpret the word ‘can’ in 
(R2) and (R3).  In response to the disjunctive strategy, Clapp suggests a 
… weaker version of NRP [that] does not deny that it is in principle possible for 
“ideal” scientists to formulate physicalistic predicates that would reduce our 
mentalistic predicates. … It rather claims that we really shall not and cannot [in 
practice] reduce our mentalistic predicates to physicalistic predicates. (2001, 135) 
 
Clapp claims that weak NRP “suggests that the nonreducibility of mentalistic predicates is purely due 
to our own epistemological limitations” (ibid., italics added); we can formulate neither infinite 
disjunctive predicates nor the complicated “wide” individual physical disjuncts that the local 
reduction strategy will arguably need to invoke (ibid., 134; see also Antony 1999, 15). 
However, denying (R2) and (R3) for purely anthropocentric epistemological reasons, as 
Clapp suggests, trivializes the debate between NRP and RP.  On Clapp’s suggestion, weak readings 
of (R2) and (R3) are false not because of the structure of the world but only because of our cognitive 
limitations.  However, this seems to be something that even some prominent defenders of RP accept.  
For instance, in a series of papers and books, Jaegwon Kim (1998, 1999) defends the local reduction 
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strategy: there are no special science properties distinct from physical properties; (R1) is true.  
However, he of course admits that mental concepts or predicates are distinct from physical ones, and 
he admits that these mental concepts “may play a practically indispensable role in our discourse, both 
ordinary and scientific” (1999, 17, italics added; see also Kim 1998, 104-5). 
These quotations suggest that what undermines the distinction between RP and weak NRP is 
not that the latter is defended on epistemic grounds but that it is defended on merely anthropocentric 
epistemic grounds. Thus, if we can identify some non-anthropocentric explanatory reasons why (R2) 
and (R3) are false, then, even though weak NRP remains primarily an epistemic doctrine, it will not 
collapse into RP.  For, the defender of weak NRP can now assert (while the defender of RP will 
deny) that the reductive explanations promised by (R2) and (R3) are impossible in principle (i.e., 
even for epistemically ideal creatures) and not merely in practice. 
4. The Generality and Explanatory Relevance of Special Science Predicates  
There are at least two non-anthropocentric reasons to prefer explanations that use a special 
science predicate, M, to those that use physical predicates that express the individual physical 
realizers of M. 
First, recall that Hilary Putnam’s and Jerry Fodor’s presentations of the multiple realizability 
argument emphasized the greater generality of special science predicates as compared to physical 
predicates.  For example, ‘is money’ is satisfied by a wider variety of objects than any complicated 
physical predicate that describes a particular kind of money (see Fodor 1974).  This greater 
generality is clearly an explanatory virtue that is not dependent on human cognitive limitations.  To 
take another example: even if we were omniscient creatures, it would still be true that the predicate 
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‘is a rigid, 1” square peg’ applies to a greater variety of objects than the physical predicate that 
expresses one of its total physical realizers (see Putnam 1975).6 
Second, defenders of the autonomy of the special sciences have often emphasized that special 
science predicates single out factors that are causally or explanatorily relevant to a given 
phenomenon, while derivations or generalizations that use physical predicates to try to explain that 
phenomenon will include many irrelevant details and hence fail to be explanatory.  Call this the 
“relevance advantage.”  For example, Philip Kitcher claims that a derivation of the general principles 
of classical genetics from molecular genetics is not explanatory because “in charting the details of the 
molecular rearrangements the derivation would only blur the outline of a simple cytological story, 
adding a welter of irrelevant detail” (1984, 347). 
Unfortunately, greater generality is not an explanatory virtue that a special science predicate, 
M, has over a disjunctive predicate that includes disjuncts for every possible realizer of M.   So, once 
we have given up the multiple realizability argument as a defense of strong NRP, we can no longer 
appeal to greater generality in an argument against (R2) and (R3). What about the relevance 
advantage? Does it survive the disjunctive and local reduction strategies? 
It is tempting to think that the greater relevance of special predicates is also compromised 
once we have given up the multiple realizability argument.  Multiply realizable predicates abstract 
away from specific details about physical implementation, and, it might be thought, it is because of 
their greater abstraction that special science predicates are both more general than particular physical 
predicates and capture relevant “high-level” uniformities that are missed at the physical level.  After 
all, it is plausible that if predicate P is more abstract than predicate Q, then P is more general than Q.  
So, if being more abstract is a necessary condition for the relevance advantage, then being more 
                                                 
6 Some might claim that I am being somewhat sloppy here (and below) in writing of realizers of 
special science predicates instead of special-science properties.  However, once we adopt weak NRP 
and accept (R1), realization arguably becomes a semantic relation. 
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general is a necessary condition for it as well.  If this line of thought were correct, then, since the 
disjunctive and local reduction strategies undermine the greater generality of (natural) special 
science predicates, they would also undermine defenses of (R2) and (R3) that are based on the 
explanatory relevance of special science predicates.  Given the prima facie plausibility of this line of 
thought, we should expect to see defenses of the relevance advantage trying to establish the multiple 
realizability (and hence generality) of special science predicates. 
 This is exactly the way that Kitcher defends the relevance of cytological predicates (and the 
irrelevance of molecular predicates) to the explanation of the transmission law of classical genetics.  
He claims in effect that (R2) is false because “explaining the transmission law requires identifying 
PS [pair separation]-processes as forming a natural kind to which processes of meiosis belong, and 
… PS-processes cannot be identified as a kind from the molecular point of view” (Kitcher 1984, 
349).  This is because PS-processes are “heterogeneous from the molecular point of view” (ibid.); 
they are “realized in a motley of molecular ways” (ibid., 350).  Importantly, not only does Kitcher 
use multiple realizability/generality to defend the explanatory relevance of special science predicates, 
he also uses it to defend the objective, non-anthropocentric superiority of high-level explanations 
(ibid.). 
I believe it is mistaken to tie the explanatory relevance of special science predicates to their 
multiple realizability/generality.  The above argument that uses abstraction as a link to attempt to 
show that generality is a necessary condition for the relevance advantage is flawed.  It conflates two 
kinds of abstraction: what I call homotopic and heterotopic abstraction.  Only homotopic abstraction 
requires greater generality (or multiple realizability), and it is not required for the relevance 
advantage. 
 Predicates for determinable properties and those for their various determinates provide a 
paradigm case of homotopic abstraction.  Determinates of a single determinable differ with respect to 
aspects of the determinable itself.  For example, one plausible account of perceived colors sees them 
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as individuated by three aspects: hue, saturation, and brightness. A determinate shade of red, like 
scarlet, is concrete in that it has a particular value of hue, saturation, and brightness.  The 
determinable red is abstract in that it is less specific regarding these aspects; it is characterized by a 
range of hue, saturation, and brightness values. We can say that predicate X is homotopically 
abstract relative to predicate Y when X takes up a larger volume of the same aspect space common 
to both X and Y.  Clearly, if predicate P is more homotopically abstract than predicate Q, then P is 
more general than Q.  (In addition to colors, think of the predicates ‘has mass’, ‘has mass between 1 
and 2 kg’, and ‘has mass of exactly 1.5 kg’.) 
By contrast, the relation between a special science predicate and a physical predicate that 
expresses one of its physical realizers differs from the relation between determinables and 
determinates; special science predicates and physical predicates belong to different aspect spaces.7  
For example, ‘is red’ will be exhaustively characterized by hue, saturation, and brightness values, but 
a predicate for one of its physical realizers—say, one expressing a micro-based property of a robin’s 
breast8—will also be characterized by physical aspects like charge, diffraction coefficients, etc.  Let’s 
say that X is heterotopically abstract relative to Y when the aspect space of X has fewer dimensions 
than Y’s aspect space, that is, when X is characterized by fewer aspects than Y. 
With this distinction in hand, we can now show that generality is not necessary for the 
relevance advantage.  This is because (a) predicate P can be more heterotopically abstract than 
predicate Q without being more general than Q, and (b) homotopic abstraction is not necessary for 
the relevance advantage; heterotopic abstraction grounds it as well. 
                                                 
7 For a related point, see Haug 2010.  For the sake of argument, I assume that the aspects that 
characterize physical predicates include those that characterize special science predicates, not that 
special science and physical predicates belong to disjoint aspect spaces. 
8 A micro-based property is the property of having proper parts that are propertied and related in 
certain ways. 
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Regarding (a), even if ‘is in pain’ were only realizable by a single physical property, say, 
having C-fibers firing in a nervous system of an appropriate kind (or a disjunctive property with this 
as one of its disjuncts), it would still be the case that ‘is in pain’ is characterized by fewer aspects—
e.g., intensity, duration, and a variety of affective-motivational and sensory-discriminative aspects—
than the physical predicate, since the latter will also be characterized by aspects like conductivity and 
degree of myelination. 
Support for (b) – that homotopic abstraction is not necessary for the relevance advantage – 
can be extracted from an interesting footnote from Putnam 1975. 
Even if it were not physically possible to realize human psychology in a creature 
made of anything but the usual protoplasm, DNA, etc., it would still not be correct to 
say that psychological states are identical with their physical realizations.  For, as will 
be argued below, such an identification has no explanatory value in psychology. 
(1975, 293, italics in original) 
 
This quotation directly denies that greater generality is needed for explanatory relevance. As Elliott 
Sober notes, Putnam must think that “the virtue of higher-level explanations does not reside 
[exclusively] in their greater generality” (1999, 549 n.8).  However, Putnam does not explain why he 
thinks this.9  Sober speculates that Putnam would say that using a physical predicate in an 
explanation provides “extraneous information,” whereas using, say, a psychological predicate does 
not.  Importantly, this extraneous information need not be based on the fact that the psychological 
predicate is more homotopically abstract (or more general) than the physical predicate.  It may 
instead be grounded in the fact that the psychological predicate is more heterotopically abstract than 
the physical predicate, abstracting away from the many physical aspects that are irrelevant to the 
explanandum at hand. 
 
                                                 
9 In fact, Putnam’s famous square peg/round hole argument for the relevance advantage seems to 
contradict the claim in the footnote by appealing to generality.  He writes: “the higher level 
explanation [in terms of rigidity and geometry] is far more general, which is why it is explanatory” 
(1975, 297, italics in original). 
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5. Multiple Expressibility by Heterotopically Abstract Predicates 
Above, I noted that Kitcher appeals to the multiple realizability of PS-processes not only to 
defend the advantage in explanatory relevance that cytological predicates have over molecular 
predicates but also to argue that this advantage is non-anthropocentric.  Given that I have argued that 
the relevance advantage is not dependent on generality and multiple realizability, one might worry 
that the relevance advantage is now too subjective. 
There are a couple related objections here.  First, there is the worry that explanatory 
relevance, in general, is overly anthropocentric.  After all, whether or not a predicate is relevant to 
the explanation of a given phenomenon depends upon what we are interested in explaining about that 
phenomenon, and this will vary over historical time and from culture to culture.  I think that this 
worry can be addressed fairly easily.  Of course, our interests are essential for singling out particular 
phenomena that we find in need of explanation (and even for constructing predicates to express those 
phenomena).  But once those phenomena are singled out, the fact that certain factors are relevant to 
explaining them, and others are not, is not anthropocentric or interest-dependent.  For example, given 
that we are interested in explaining why a man winced and moaned, the intensity and duration of his 
pain will be very relevant, while the mass and opacity of his nerve fibers will be less so.  We can 
allow that the world has a “built-in” structure of natural phenomena and that which natural 
phenomena we have access to is partly a function of our cognitive capacities and interests.  This is of 
course compatible with there being natural phenomena that do not align with our interests or that are 
inaccessible to us. 
However, this line of response leads to a subtler objection.  Given that we are admitting that 
there are natural phenomena that are inaccessible to us, the reductionist can claim that there are some 
inaccessible special science phenomena relative to which (possibly disjunctive) physical predicates 
do not contain any irrelevant, extraneous information.  If we were smarter, we might have different 
interests to which “messy” physical predicates, and their associated aspects, were entirely relevant.  
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Further, the objection continues, these inaccessible explanations might do all the work done by 
current special science explanations.10 If this response were successful, it would show that special 
sciences exist only because we are focusing on an arbitrarily limited set of legitimate explanatory 
interests and explananda.  In principle, physical aspects can do all of the explanatory work that needs 
to be done. 
 I think that this objection can also be successfully rebutted.  The key point is that any 
physical property that is plausibly type-identical to some, say, psychological property will not only 
be characterized physical aspects that are irrelevant to some behavioral explanandum, it will also 
likely be characterized by other special science aspects that are irrelevant to that behavioral 
explanandum.  In other words, since a physical property, R, for which type-identity is plausible must 
be a total realizer of a given special science predicate, M, it is likely that it will be multiply 
expressible by several other special science predicates, each of which is heterotopically abstract 
relative to the physical predicate that expresses R and each of which belongs to an aspect space 
distinct from the one to which M belongs.  When this occurs, let us say that R is heterotopically 
multiply expressible. 
Examples of heterotopic multiple expressibility appear to be widespread.  For instance, 
consider a sample of gold, which satisfies the predicates ‘is rigid,’ ‘has a high electrical and thermal 
conductivity’, ‘is ductile’, and ‘has a distinctive luster’.  These predicates all express a complicated 
micro-based physical property of the gold sample, the core of which is the cloud of free electrons that 
permeates the metal (see Menzies 1988 for this example). Or, consider the predicate ‘is in pain.’ As 
Colin Allen notes, “pain is processed by multiple [brain] regions, in a highly distributed system; there 
                                                 
10 We need not turn to inaccessible phenomena to make a related point.  Sometimes we seek 
explanatory depth rather than breadth; for example, we may be interested in the microphysical details 
that explain why this particular square peg (made of, say, gold) doesn’t fit through this particular 
round hole (see Sober 1999, 548ff.).  And quite specific physical aspects might be relevant to this 
question. 
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is no single brain region whose destruction completely abolishes the experience of pain, sensory 
processing occurs in areas classically associated with affect, and affect itself is at least a three-layer 
process with the prefrontal cortex being mainly important for the latest stage of processing” (2004, 
620).  Pain processing appears to occur in parallel in a plastic, bilateral system activating neurons in 
the cerebellum, anterior cingulate cortex, insula, thalamus, ventral premotor cortex, and prefrontal 
cortex, among other areas (Coghill et al. 1999). These findings strongly suggest that if we have a 
plausible candidate for a micro-based property that is a total realizer of ‘is in pain’, it is likely that 
this property will also be expressed by distinct psychological predicates concerning affect, motor 
control, attention, and memory consolidation, some of which may not be conscious and all of which 
are not easily picked out in everyday language (rough descriptions might include: ‘is highly vigilant’, 
‘has narrowly focused attention’, and ‘is in a certain motivational state’). In both of these cases the 
realized special science predicates cross-cut one another; they are different kinds of predicates, 
characterized by different aspects. 
Heterotopic multiple expressibility allows us to strengthen the argument that (R2) is false for 
non-anthropocentric reasons, without relying on generality/multiple realizability.  Reductive 
explanation of a psychological generalization like “acute pain usually causes wincing” (to take a 
crude example) need not fail solely because ‘is in pain’, is realized in a motley of neural or electronic 
ways (as suggested by Kitcher).  Rather, reductive explanation may also fail because a motley 
assortment of special science predicates each express the single complicated physical property, R, 
that realizes ‘is in pain’.  Using the physical predicate ‘is R’ in a derivation of the psychological 
generalization at best tells us that some of the aspects that characterize it (associated with the various 
the special science predicates that express the property R) are responsible for the truth of this 
generalization.  Thus, the physical explanation amounts to using the disjunction of all the special 
science predicates that express the realizer R: ‘is in acute pain’ along with, e.g., ‘is highly vigilant’ 
and ‘has narrowly focused attention’.  (For a related point, see Gasper 1992, 668-9.)  So, this 
 14 
physical derivation of the psychological generalization will be objectively deficient as an explanation 
because it includes all of the irrelevant aspects that characterize these other special science 
predicates.  By contrast, citing the predicate ‘is in pain’ singles out only those aspects that are 
causally relevant to the wincing. 
Similarly, (R3) is false not merely for anthropocentric reasons.  Psychological explanations 
may be deeper and theoretically more fecund than physical explanations because they isolate causal 
aspects of R that are relevant to some specific behavior (like wincing) from those that are irrelevant.  
The explanation in terms of ‘is R’ may contain more information since it is expressed by many 
special science predicates and plays a role in a corresponding number of sets of causal interactions, 
but not all of this information is relevant to the mental or behavioral explanandum at issue.  Physical 
predicates and aspects are unable to distinguish between the many different sets of special science 
causal interactions in which the property R participates. 
To take another example, even if we are interested only in why, say, some particular square 
gold peg does not fit through a round hole, the physical predicate that expresses the total physical 
realizer of ‘is rigid’ will include irrelevant detail.  This physical predicate will also be expressed by 
special science predicates like ‘is ductile’ and ‘has a distinctive luster,’ which are characterized by 
aspects that are irrelevant to the peg’s not fitting through the hole. 
A final objection: someone might simply deny that the relevant total physical realizers are 
expressible by different kinds of special science predicates.  That is, one might allege that by singling 
out certain components of the total micro-based realizer, we can obtain a “stripped down” property 
that will not be heterotopically multiply expressible—a property that is uniquely expressed by a 
given special science predicate (and by all of its rough synonyms and more or less homotopically 
abstract predicates). The crucial case to consider is whether a “minimally expressed” physical 
realizer of say, ‘is in pain,’ – one for which no “smaller” realizer is also expressed by ‘is in pain’ – is 
heterotopically multiply expressible. 
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Whether many “minimally expressed” realizers are heterotopically multiply expressible is 
ultimately an empirical question.  However, I think that some general considerations about total 
realizers suggest that many will be.  On the one hand, if one strips down the physical realizer solely 
with respect to its individual physical aspects or components in an effort to achieve unique 
expressibility, then we will no longer have a property expressed by ‘is in pain.’   For example, 
singling out aspects like conductivity or a property like having C-fibers firing will result in a realizer 
that is not sufficient for the instantiation of pain.  For, pain requires complex interactions between 
different kinds of physical aspects in a particular context in order to be instantiated.  (Having C-fibers 
firing is not sufficient for pain; it is at best a core realizer.)  On the other hand, if one appeals to 
“high-level,” functional aspects in an attempt to pare down the realizer, then one has effectively 
conceded that (R2) and (R3) are false.  One has accepted that physical aspects are not sufficient for 
formulating all of the generalizations that there are. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 Even in the face of the local reduction and disjunctive strategies, some philosophers may 
want to defend strong NRP instead of accepting (R1) (perhaps by arguing for a hyperintensional 
criterion of property identity).  However, if the arguments in this paper are on the right track, they 
need not do so in order to offer non-anthropocentric reasons for weak NRP.  By grounding the 
greater explanatory relevance of special science predicates on their heterotopic abstraction relative to 
physical predicates, defenders of weak NRP can still endorse a claim that all non-reductionists should 
accept: there are special sciences because of the way the world is put together, and not merely 
because of the nature of our epistemic relation to the world (cf. Fodor 1974, 113)
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